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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GARY M. NAGLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

I

vs.
CLUB FONITAINBLEU,
)
a Utalh corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
10198

RE·SPON'DENT'S BRIEF
STA'TE'MENT ·OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is ~an ·action commenced by the P'lain'tiff
for the specific performance of an agreement an·d
assignment or, in the altern'ative, for a judgment
against the Defendant for monies due and owing on
an agreed account for improvements to re~a'l property and for monies due on a promissory note and
also for the foreclosure of 'the Plaintiff's mech'anic's·
lien.
DISPOSITION IN IJOWER co·uR·T
The Plaintiff was awarded judgment against
the Defendant in the amount of $19,738.48 and
'$52.70 costs of court, lbut the trial court held that
1

1
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the Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid_and the
Agreement and Assignment between the parties,
dated September 1, 196'2, provided for a penalty
and could not be enforced.
RELIEF SOU'GH·T ON AP PEAL
1

·The Res'pondent seeks to have thlis, Court sustain those portions of the tri'al 'Court's judgment
which held tllat Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid and the Agreement an'd Assignment between
the parties, dated September 1, 1962, to be a penalty
and thus unenforceable.
STATEMENT OF FkC TS
1

It is necessary for Defendant to set forth additional facts and to correct misstatement of some
fa·cts in Appellant's brief with respect to tr~ansac
tions 'between Appellant and Respon-dent and the
relationship between these parties. Respondent, during 19 60, purch·ased two p-arcels of land at or near
1651- Vine Street, Salt Lake City, U'tah, ~and these
two parcels were purchased under separate Uniform Real Estate Contracts an·d not as one parcel
of land. The ap·proxim~ate six acres of land which
was sold to the Plaintiff-Appellant for residential
building lots was origin·ally purChased by the Club
an·d 'found to be too small for the Club purposes and
was then sold to Appellan't un·der a Uniform Re~al
EHtate Contract. The Respondent Purchased the
present Club si te of ap·proxim ately 6.3'5 acres of
1

1

1

2
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land under a separate transaction. The Defendant
in approximately May, 1960 agreed to share proportionate~ly with the Plaintiff for moving of a
cooler house, construction of water-sewer line, roadway and bridge, and did request that invoices correctly showing the amount ex~pended for these ·particular projects be submitted to the Defen·dant. The
Plaintiff submitted ·a billing of $12,2'77.26 which
purported to be an itemized invoice but there was
no indication whether or not some of the materials
invoiced were used by the Plaintiff for construction
in his subdivision or whether the en:tire amourrt was
used in conneetion with the projects under the agreement with the Defendant. The Defendant did accept the $12,277.26 figure as correct but at t~hat
time requested that the Plaintiff submit separate
invoices showing the dates of delivery of concrete,
asphalt, and other materials:. T·he Defen·dant further agreed to deposit $1,000.00 in trust with respect to this contract but was verbally assured by
the Plaintiff th!at this deposit was not necessary
since the Club was in the midst of a promotion
campaign and needed all of the money available
for promotion and opening of the Club.
Wi'fu respect to completion of the roadway and
bridge, there was never any ·complaint from the
Plaintiff to the Defendant that the roadway and
bridge could not be com'ple'ted until October 15, 1962
because Defendant failed to make payment to the
plaintiff and, in fact, the only ·agreement was that
3
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of participation in costs. The roadway in question
was bein·g put in by a subcontractor on behalf of
the Plaintiff herein to serve the subdivision being
built by the Plaintiff, and the work on the bridge
was being done almost entirely by the Plaintiff person·ally or with 'the ihelp of one or two of his workmen. 'The completion of the bridge in question was
necessary for access to the subdivision of the Pla'intiff bul wa:s not necessary at all for ·access to the
C1ub property ·and was, in fact, farther north on
the roadway from the entrance to the Club property
and was not used by· ·Club mem·bers for ingress to
the Club property.
The Board of Directors of the Defendant in
early 19'62 had no understan·ding, verbal or otherwise, that Plaintiff was to receive funds as new
members~hi'ps were sold and, in fact, ~he Plaintiff
assured the Board of Directors that he could dbtain
materials and labor and complete the Clubhouse
with little or no expenditure of money for a considerable length of time after the m'a:tter was first
discussed in the ea1~ly part of 1962. Considerable
labor was donated by the members of the Club in
this con·struction. Only one door in the Clubhouse
was hung by the Plaintiff and was improperly hung
so that it ·had to be corrected 'before winter, and the
en1tire ·Clubhouse and pool'area was prepared for the
winter by the Club members.
4
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ARGUMEN·T
POINT I
THAT T·HE TRI.A!L ·COURT DID NOT EIRRO·R IN
HOLDING PLAINTIFF'S ·ME·CHANI C,S LIEN INVALID.
1

After the ·con~clusion of all te·stimony an·d evidence, the trial court, by its Memorandum Decision, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment, held that the Pl,aintiff's ·mechanic's lien, Exhibit No. 10, was· invalid. While the
Memorandum Decision . of the trial court does not
state the reason for holding Plaintiff's mech·anic's
lien invalid, and the Appellant would h'ave this
Court believe th,a.t the trial court remarked to the
effect that the $11,000.00 promissory note dated
Septem:ber 1, 19·6'2 was given in payment of the
claimed labor and material represented by the mechani'c's lien, the fa~cts of this case would indicate
otherwise. Un·der the facts of the case i't appe'ars
that all of the contra·ct work done by the Plaintiff
was completed durin~g ~he spring of 1962, with the
exception of the hanging of one door in November,
1962. It is admitted that the mechanic's lien was
recorded on the 20th day of November, 196'2 which,
according to the testimony presented, was ~at least
five months after the work done by the plaintiff.
This, coupled with the fact that the Plaintiff was
a member of the Board of Directors of the Defendant Club and had represented to the Board of Directors of the Club that he would do the work involved
1

5
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for little or no money, as eviden·ced by Exhibits
Nos. 15 'and 16, and in view of the fact that much
of the work performed was done by the Club members, and since the last work claimed to be done
by Plaintiff in November was that whic·h could be
classified as trivial or minor, substantiates the position of the Defendant ;~hat 'the lien filed by the
Plain tiff was not varid.
1

1

This C'ourt has held that trivial or minor adjustments made casually or long after the main work
has been eom:pleted cannot be used to tie onto as
the last labor done or m~aterials furnished in order
'to ·preserve or reinstate lien rights of 'a claimant.
Wilcox vs. Clow,ard, et al, Utah 56 P2 1.
It has never been ·claimed that the issuance
of the note with its coin~ciding agreement was done
'vith the intention to deprive the .Pl'aintiff of any
lien rig~hts that he may have had, but there is little
question that the facts show the time for filing
liens had long expired at the time that Plaintiff prep!ared and file'd the lien claimed in this action. The
court was therefore correct in rul'ing that the Pl'aintiff's mechanic's lien rights were not in effect and
that his lien was invalid.
POINT II.
. THAT THE TRIAL C,O'URT DID NOT ERROR IN
H'OLDING THAT TH'E AGREE'M'ENT AND ASSIGNM:E'NT BE'TWEEN THE PARTIES, DATE'D SEPTEM6
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BER 1, 1962, WAS A PENALTY RA'THE!R THAN A
FORFEJITURE.

At the time of the trial of ~his matter, there
was introduced into evidence as Exhibit P-25, a
copy of the mi;nutes of the Board of Directors' meetin.g.of the Defendant Club, dated August 30, 1962.
These miiriutes indica:te that at ·tha't meeting a promi'ssory note ·and Lan·d Assignment Agreement had
been submitted to the Board of Directors by the
Plaintiff, Gary Nagle, for the Board's consideration. T'he promissory note submitted was in the
sum of $20,000.00, and as a result thereof there was
considerable discussion ~among the members of the
Board of Directors. It was determined by the Bo'ard
of Directors that a note in the sum of $11,000.00,
together with the Land Assignment Agreement,
would be given to the Plaintiff. The sum of $11,000.00, as indicated by Exhi'bit P-25, was a compromise figure and was given in order to sati~sfy
the claim of Mr. Nagle. The note and Land Assignment were delivered to Mr. Don E. Hammill for
redrafting in order that they conformed 'to 'the motions made and carried at the Board of Directors'
meeting. This Land Agreement w·as no't prepared
by Mr. Hammill, to the detriment of Mr. N agle,
but was the ~agreement submi'tted by Mr. Nagle ·and
was substantially the same ·agreement, except for
the amounts involved, after fue conelusion of 'the
Board of Directors' meeting. Plaintiff's claim that
he s'hould be pl:aced in an advantageous 'position by
1

7
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reason of the fact that Mr. Hammill, who was a
practicing attorney, prepared the agreement to the
detriment of Mr. Nagle, cannot be considered by
this Court in view of the true facts.
This Court has often held that the enforcement
of a forfeiture provision allowing recovery, which
bears no reasonable rel·ationship to actual! damages,
should not be allowed. Western MG)caroni Mfg. Co.
vs. Fiorre, 71 Utah 2 74, 264 P 9'75; Young vs.
Hansen, 218 P2 666; Green vs. Nelson, Utah, 232
P2 776. In the Utah case of Perkins, et al, vs. Spencer, t21. Utah 4'68, 24'3 P2 44-6, The Supreme Court
reiterated this position when it stated:
1

"'This Court is committed to the doctrine that
where the pai~ties to a contract stipulate the
amount of liquidated damages that shall be
paid in case of a breacll, such stipulation is,
as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actual'ly sustained."
The ·Court continued:
"On the ·contrary, where enforcement of the
forfei1ture provision would allow an unconscionable and ex·horbitant recovery be·aring no
reasonable relation to the actual dam·age suffered, we h·ave uniformly held it to be unenforceable."
'The Court, in addition to the holding of the
Perkins case, held, in the ·case of Jacobson vs.
Sw~an, 27 8 P2 ·2'98:
1

8
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''When the Trial Judge has made such determination, we will regard it 'as prima facie
correct and will not disturb it unless it is
plainly erroneous."
In Plaintiff's brief, 'he staters fue value of his
claim ~as against the property values, in·dicafing that
the net equity of 'the Defendant would ·be ap·proximately $'24,800.00, which is only $'5,000.00 more
than the claimed judgment of the 'Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff, however, fails to advis-e the ~c~ourt of the
value of the im~provements on the real property,
which makes the claim fall witHin the rule in
the Perkins vs. Spencer case, sup~a. Exhibit
P-17 is a fin'anc1al statement of the Defeii'd'ant
Corporation, whi·ch indi'cates thaJt lthe land value
of 'the ·Corporati'On is $35,756.78, and that the value
of the buildings and improvements is $7'2,803.84,
or a total va'lue of $108,560.62. There is ·owing
against the lan d p11rchase contraet the sum of
$26,200.00, leaving a net value of the assets at
the sum of $82,360.62. This is the amount ~h·at was
given to secure the claim of the promirssory note to
the Plaintiff in the sum of $11,000.00, and it would
certainly appear th'at if the Plaintiff were ~allowed
to assume the Defendan't's position as regards the
real property, for an $11,000.00 note, he would be
obtain ing real property and improvements worth
$82,360.62. T·his certainly appears to be s:o grossly
excessive 'a:s 'to ·be entirely ·disproportionate to any
loss -contemplated by the ·parties, and that its enforcemen't would certain'ly be so shocking to the conscien~ce that fue trial court ~could, in all equity, re1

1

1
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fuse to enforce the provision for forfeiture on the
basis that it constituted a penalty.
The Court's fin·dings of a penalty is again supported by the evidence that 'at the time, in April,
1963, when Plaintiff advised the Defendant that he
did not feel secure and was calling for payment of
·his note before its maturity date, he was advised by
the Board of Directors of Defendant Club that they
would honor the note ·an·d m'ake payment upon it
but would not pay attorney's fees since they did not
concur in !his eonclusion that ~he Was no longer secure
in his position. This offer was refused by the Plaintiff, who a short time thereafter filed 'legal action to
collect on the note, even though payment was offered.
The trial court decision in 't'his ma'tter certainly
ap·pe'ars to be well within the rule of Jacobson vs.
S1.oan, supra.
POINT III.
THAT THE DEFEN·DANT, THROUGH ITS CONDU'CT, HAS N·o·T W AIVE·D THE RIGHT TO QUESTION
THE V kLIDITY O·F THE AGREEMENT AND ASSIGNMEN'T O·F SEPT'EMBER 1, 1962, AND IS N·OT ESTOP·PED FR'OM CLAJ!MING THAT IT EX.A!CTS A 'PENALTY.

The promissory note and Agreement and Assign~ment of September 1, 19'62 were not prepared
by the President of the Defendant Corporation, Mr.
Don E. Hammill, a practicing attorney, ·as indicated
by Plaintiff's brief. As 'heretofore stated and ~as
shown by Exhiibit P-25, the note and Land Assign-

to
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ment Agreement were prepared by Mr. Nagle or
Mr. Nagle''S re·presentatives an·d ~presented to the
Board of Directors . of the. Defendan't Corporation
for their acceptance. The note ·and Lan!d Assignment
Agreement were not a.cce·pted. by -the ·Board' of ·.Directors by reas'On of the fact that the sum involved
was far in excess of the amoun't that the Board
of Directors felt to be due and owing and, ~as a result
theredf, a compromise amount was agreed upon, an·d
Mr. Hammill was reque'sted to redraft the documenlts to reflect the ·compromised figure. The documentswere redrafted in sulbstanti~aJly the same form
as when ·presented by Mr. Nagle an·d were executed
in conforman'ce with the decision of the Board of
Directors. The purpose of the Agreement and the
note was not to give 'the Club 'the sole ·benefit by
reducing to a specific figure the undertermined
amount theretofore existing between the parties
hereto; there was also considerable benefit ·derived
by the Plaintif in th!is action, since he received ·a
note for a specific amount, wherein his claim prior
to this time had been for an amount that was disputed by the Defendant ·Corporation. From the exHibits presented, it is ap·parent that there was eonslidera:ble feeling an·d animosity between Mr. Nagle
and the Board of Directors of the Defendant Club
by reason of his staJtements th·a't the work ·could be
done with little or no cost when, in fact, he presented to them a bill of S:U'bstantial size.
11
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By executing the note and Land Assignment
Agreement in this action, the Defendant did not
designedly induce the Plaintiff to change his conduct or alter his condition in reli'ance upon any representation of the Plaintiff; in fact, the Defendant
acted in accordance with the request of the Plaintiff; except for the amount to be paid, w'hich amount
was agreed upon by the parties.
The case of Rav1arino vs. Price, 123 Utah 5'59,
260 P2 570, as cited by the Plaintiff, is distinguishable both on the f!acts an d the law, since there were
representations made in that case which were made
for the purpose of influencing the conduc't of 'the
injured party, which facts are certainly not present
here.
1

As fur\ther evidence of the fact that the Defendant, through its conduct, did not waive i'ts ri'ght
to question the validity of tlle Agreements involved
herein, we must again point to the Court the fact
that when the Pla'intiff accelerated 'the maturity
date of the n'ote by reason of :his claim of 'insecurity,
that the Defen·dant Corporation offered to pay the
face value of the note but refused to pay attorney's
fees by reason of the fact that they ·did not concur
in the necessity for the accelerated maturity date.
This certainly seems to be within reason and would
cer'tain'ly substantiate the position of the ·Defendant
Corporation that they were ·able to pay the note as
it matured. To permit the Defen·dant to refuse pay1

12
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ment and then stand upon the claim for forfeiture
would not be just or eq-uitable.
CON·CLUSION
It is strongly urged ·by the D·efendant herein
that the trial court, having heard all of the testimony and reviewed all of the exhibits, ·and being
fully advised of the facts as they existed in this
matter, rightfully determined tha;t the lien claim
of the Defendant was invalid an·d that the Agreement and Assignment of Sep'tem·ber 1, 1962 was a
pena'lty an·d not a forfeiture.
It is further urged that the trial court d1d nnt
error in its decisions in this matter nor did it
erroneouslly interpret the documents involved in this
·case. 'The relative positions of the parties during
the entire ·period of their association indicates that
such association was other than the normal contractor-owner relationship and that Plaintiff's position
of innocen·ce, as indicated by his brief, is not substantiated by the facts ·and evidence presented in
this matter.
It is therefore submitted by the Defen·dan't that
the trial court's decision should stand.
Respectfully submitted,
DANSIE, ELLETT AND
HAMIMIDL
1

Attorneys for Respondent
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah
13
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